Historically, union organizing drives have been beset by spying. The history is fascinating, and as union supporters, we must acknowledge that labor spies will probably be with us as long as workers have bosses.

 

I'd like to offer a couple of examples of turning labor spying to advantage.

  

The Flint Journal, Saturday October 14th, 2006, published an account of how the formative UAW fooled General Motors during the first major sitdown strikes of the 1930s. What the account doesn't explain is that the group of workers who later became the union knew there were spies in the ranks. They held a secret meeting, and the information provided in that meeting found its way to the company. Here's how the article described it:

 

(excerpt) The UAW decided to strike two plants in January, 1937. The date was

moved up to Dec. 30, 1936, when word came that General Motors was

moving dies out of Fisher Plant 2. First Plant 2 was occupied, then

Fisher Plant 1.

 

"Nobody was afraid of anything," Kuchar said. "We said we're going to

have a strike. We had a strike. It was supported by everybody." Workers

in the striking plants locked themselves in, while those who worked in

the other shops took the role of "vigilantes," protecting them from the

outside. "It was bitter cold that winter," John said. "What really

helped us," he remembered, "President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Gov.

Frank Murphy both supported labor." Other strikes had been demolished

by police or soldiers breaking them up, but here in Flint, Gov. Murphy

sent in the National Guard to keep peace and protect the workers. He

warned that no police were to enter the plants with guns.

 

That didn't prevent the "Battle of Bulls' Run" on Jan. 11. The battle

raged for six hours after police tried to stop a food delivery to

strikers. City police in riot gear tried to storm the weakly held

Fisher 2 Plant. Workers stayed as tear gas filled the plant, but

family, friends and other workers outside the plant broke all the

windows for air to circulate. They did not give up. The police finally

retreated.

 

On Feb. 1, the union "leaked out" word that they were going to take

Chevrolet Plant No. 9. General Motors diverted all its resources to

protect Plant No. 9. Instead, workers came from Chevrolet Plant No. 6

and helped shut down the massive Chevrolet Plant No. 4, forming the

largest group of strikers in Flint.

 

"There were almost 5,000 people outside that plant," Kuchar remembers.

Workers held the plant for 10 days before General Motors gave in and

recognized the UAW. The strike was over Feb. 11, 1937.

 

As a press operator, Kuchar's wages went up from 50 cents per hour to

$1.05. Kuchar continued to work for GM for 40 years, retiring in 1974. 

 

The organizers knew all along that the company was trying to keep track of their activities. Feeding disinformation back through the company spy conduit became a successful diversionary tactic which allowed the real plan to succeed.

 

The Pinkerton Labor Spy, written by Morris Friedman, details how the Pinkerton Agency had infiltrated the United Mine Workers before a strike in the 1903-04 period. Wherever union organizers or officers went to meet with groups of miners, they were met by mobs of company thugs who would beat them bloody. The United Mine Workers learned the hard way that the company spy network was extensive. What they didn't know (until the Friedman book was published) was that some of their top officials were actually Pinkerton agents.

 

Out Of The Depths, a book written by Barron Beshoar, describes the United Mine Workers strike one decade later. This strike gained world wide attention because of the massacre at Ludlow, Colorado. But we can learn from the organizing efforts that preceded the strike. 

 

After what organizer John Lawson described as "many setbacks," the organizing tactics changed. From Beshoar's book: 

 

(excerpt) The union had no money with which to wage a battle. [The local union headquarters] was closed, and all known organizers were ordered back to Denver. To all appearances, the union organization had simply collapsed. Branch organizations were no longer formed. As new men were enrolled, they were given special cards as members of the international union. The recruits were not affiliated with a union local nor did they know each other as union members. In this manner, the company spy system was frustrated.

    

Deceived by this strategy, [the two companies] became more confident of their power than ever before. Abuses of long standing, which had been tempered somewhat while the organizers were in Southern Colorado, were revived and intensified. Oppressive tactics were employed everywhere, but they merely served to aid the work of the secret organization. Revolt was in the air.

 

The union built up strength, and then announced its intentions. But the secret organizing effort was further refined:

 

Twenty-one pairs of organizers were put through a special course and then sent into the southern field. Their operation was simple, but effective. One member of each team was known as the active organizer; the other was the passive organizer. The so-called active organizer moved into the open and was known to everyone as an organizer. His passive team mate posed as a miner looking for work. He cussed the unions and their leadership, and obtained a job in the heavily guarded mines. He made friends with officers of the company and, where possible, hired out as a coal company spotter. Miners who served as spotters were paid from $10 to $30 extra each month by the coal company to report fellow workers who were either union members or disposed to join the union.

    

Once the passive organizer was installed in the mine, his active team mate sought new members in that mine. If a miner joined, the active organizer kept the man's membership secret and sent his card directly to the Denver office. Despite the public plea [that the union had made in organizing the strike] for organization of locals, there was no need for them nor would they have been desireable. There were too many spies about. If a working miner refused to join, his name was sent to the passive organizer who immediately reported to the company that John Cotino had joined the union. The result was always the same. The company sent John Cotino packing down the [canyon], with or without the preliminary kangaroo. In this manner a constant stream of anti-union and non-union men, the confirmed strike breakers and scabs, were kept streaming down the [canyons]. The companies unwittingly sent the faithful out, while the active organizer sent carefully coached men of union affiliation to apply for the jobs that had to be filled... In one month, the active-passive system caused the operators to send more than 3,000 non-union men down the [canyon]. Their places were taken by 3,000 union men.

 

Thousands of union campaigns have been recorded, and there is much that the organizer can learn from labor history.

 

Now of course, laws, work situations, and some of the organizing obstacles are different. But bosses are much the same. An organizing drive can become a chess match where the organizer has to match wits with the other guy. Best to have a full bag of tricks.

 

I wrote the article about labor spies on Wikipedia:

 

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labor_spies

 

Although it occasionally comes under attack, the article remains substantially as i created it. I think that it, together with a companion article on union busting, bring together in one place an overview of how management sometimes counters organizing drives.

 

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_busting 

 

best wishes,

richard myers

Denver, Colorado

http://www.rebelgraphics.org